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Introduction
China's transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market driven economy has been well documented in the literature. In particular, the sustained growth in GNP and the dismantling of the old communist central planning apparatus have been widely lauded by economists and investors everywhere. However, until 2006, the strong economic growth was juxtaposed with poor corporate performance based on accounting numbers and stock market returns (Chen, Firth, and Rui 2006a) .
In our sample period, 2000 to 2005, corporate profitability improves although stock returns are often negative. A number of factors have placed constraints on firms' performances, including the state's continuing ownership interest in listed firms and the lack of monitoring of, and the absence of incentives for, top management.
1 Old socialist principles still underlie the running of many listed firms and these may have lingering effects on economic efficiency. Manifestations of these principles include the quest for full employment and pay equality between top management and the average worker. One might expect these principles to die harder in state controlled listed firms than in privately controlled listed firms.
Our objective in this paper is to examine top management compensation in China's listed firms.
The design of compensation systems is a reflection of a firm's corporate governance and has been the focus of much research in the U.S. and other developed economies. 2 This research has examined, among other things, whether pay depends on performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Conyon and Murphy 2000; Bebchuk and Fried 2006) ; the role of corporate governance, including board structure and ownership, on compensation (Cheung, Stouraitas, and Wong 2005; Core et al. 1999; Bebchuk and Fried 2006) ; and whether behavioral theories (e.g., tournament theory or relative depravation theory) can help explain the disparity 1 By state we mean central, regional, and municipal government as well as state ministries and wholly government owned enterprises. 2 According to Warren Buffet, the way a CEO is compensated is a key test of a firm's commitment to good governance (letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., February 2004) . Thus, we can draw insights into a firm's governance by examining top management pay. Buffet opines that he is disappointed in the governance of many firms.
between the top manager's pay and the compensation of other managers and workers (e.g. , Bloom 1999; Bognanno 2001; Main, O'Reilly, and Wade 1993; Jirjahn and Kraft 2007; Lazear 1991; Rajgopal and Srinivasan 2008; Bebchuk, Cremers, and Urs 2008) . In this paper, we revisit these questions using data from China. In particular, we examine the determinants of pay levels, the pay of top management relative to the average worker, and pay and performance sensitivities and elasticities. .
The listed company sector of the economy has grown dramatically and by 2009 there were now more than 1500 listed firms with a market capitalization exceeding U.S.$3 trillion, which made it the second largest in the world. Moreover, China has opened up its economy to allow foreigners to invest in its listed firms and to allow full control of firms by foreigners. The changes in the investment landscape call out for research into the way firms operate and, in our case, how top management is compensated.
We find that a firm's performance has a positive impact on top management compensation. A 1000 RMB increase in stockholder wealth results in a 0.0038 RMB increase in the top manager's pay. 3 This result is similar to the pay performance sensitivities in U.S. firms during the 1970s (Murphy 1999). We also find that the pay disparity between top managers and the average worker is partially explained by a firm's stock returns and profitability. Thus, any move away from egalitarian pay is justified by performance. The positive pay-performance relation applies to firms regardless of who the major stockholder is.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional background of China's modern enterprise reforms. This section describes the general framework for setting top executive pay in China and introduces the research questions that we investigate. We present the research design in section 3 and describe the sample, variable selection, and the regression models. Section 4 describes the results of the pay levels tests and the pay and performance relations. Section 5 presents conclusions.
Institutional background
At the beginning of the reform process, most listed firms were carved out of state owned enterprizes (SOEs). It was the profitable operating units of an SOE that were listed and the non-operating units (e.g., schools, hospitals), non-profitable units, and so-called 'strategic units'
were retained by the SOE. When the profitable units were listed, the parent SOE typically kept voting control or else the voting control was passed to a unit of the state. Typically, the free float of shares was 25 to 30%. Over time, the state's ownership has been reduced, but, even now, the state still remains the dominant owner of a majority of listed firms. However, some of the equity carve-out SOEs are now majority owned by a private investor. Additionally, there are a growing number of privately owned businesses that have become listed.
A striking characteristic of the listed firms is that there is a single dominant owner, be it the state or private, which has effective control of the company. On average, the largest single investor owns 46% of a listed firm and the second largest investor owns about 7% (Chen, Firth, and Xu 2009) . We are therefore able to characterize a listed firm as state controlled or privately controlled depending on who the major stockholder is. Shleifer (1998), among others, argues that state ownership stifles the creative talents of management and forces firms to pursue policies that help meet government objectives rather than maximize economic efficiency and stockholder wealth.
This might imply that state controlled and private controlled listed firms will monitor and incentivize their managers differently. In particular, extrapolating from prior studies (e.g., Shleifer 1998) leads to a prediction that state controlled firms will not use profitability and stockholder wealth as performance measures in setting compensation or, if they do use these measures, they will place less weight on them vis-à-vis private firms. However, there are opposing views and some early evidence in China suggests the state does recognize the need to give incentives to management. For example, in the 1980s the government introduced a contract responsibility system for SOEs where managers were rewarded if the SOE's performance exceeded the targets specified in the contract (Chen et al. 2006a) . Further evidence of the use of performance related pay for the managers of China's SOEs (before the stock exchanges were opened) is given in Groves et al. (1994) and Mengistae and Xu (2004) . Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006, 2007a) , find mixed evidence on performance-related pay in China's listed firms. Using data from 1998 to 2000, they find that pay is related to accounting performance but not to stock returns. Prior to the reform era, managers' and workers' cash compensation were similar although the managers also enjoyed perquisites that were not available to the general workers. After the reforms began, labor mobility increased as firms competed for the best managers. This leads to an increase in wage dispersion.
Pay disparities
High pay disparities between different ranks of employees and managers, as exist in many firms in the U.S., can be explained by tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Main et al. 1993; Lynch 2005; Lee, Lev, and Yeo 2008; Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaren 2009) . Here, pay disparities increase in the upper hierarchies of an organization. This creates strong incentives for lower level managers and employees to compete hard for promotion and they will exert substantial effort and commitment to win the tournament prize (the large increase in compensation that goes with the promotion). The increase in effort will benefit the firm's stockholders.
Low pay disparity can be explained by relative depravation and distributive justice theories, which say lower level managers and employees feel aggrieved at the high pay of their superiors (Deutsch 1985; Henderson and Fredrickson 2001) and therefore cooperation declines in the organization. The resentment created by high pay disparities can jeopardize the firm's profitability and efficiency (Dye 1984; Lazear 1989; Siegel and Hambrick 2005) . An egalitarian approach, where pay differences between top managers and other workers are small, may lead to greater productivity (Bloom 1999; Drago and Garvey 1998; Levine 1991 in China, we analyze the variation in the pay of top executives in a listed firm relative to the average worker's pay, and then examine if pay disparities can be explained by a firm's performance.
Presumably, pay disparities are more palatable for workers and for society as a whole if a firm's performance is very good.
How is top management compensation set?
China's Company Law (1993, as amended in 1999) 
Issues
While our study is exploratory in nature, we nevertheless set out to examine a number of important issues. These issues include understanding the influence of ownership and governance on the setting of pay levels, evaluating the differences in pay between top management and wokers, and the relation between pay and performance. Top management pay relative to the average worker's pay is a sensitive issue in China because of its impact on social harmony. Increased differences may be justified by superior firm performance and so we examine this issue. Agency theory predicts that effective reward systems that relate pay to performance, will enhance firm value. We therefore examine pay sensitivities and elasticities.
Overall, China has experienced high rates of economic growth and the development of legal, financial, institutional, and governance environments has been very rapid. However, the market development has not been equal across China's regions. In fact there is tremendous variation in the degree of market development and some regions in China's hinterland are little changed since the beginning of the reforms. Chen et al. (2006b) and Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007b) find that regional differences can have a profound effect on fraud, the informativeness of accounting reports, and other corporate events. With this in mind, we examine whether the level of market development has an impact on the pay-performance relation and the pay disparity-performance relation. Firms disclose the total perks paid but do not identify the names of those who receive them. We believe most of the perks are paid to the top management.
The total of the executive directors' compensation has to be disclosed in a firm's financial statements. This compensation is salary and bonus; unfortunately most firms do not distinguish between salary and bonus and instead they report one lump sum. In the later years of our sample period the pay of the CEO or managing director is disclosed but the data are incomplete in the earlier years. Firms also disclose the collective pay of the three highest paid directors and we use the average of this pay as one of the dependent variables (there are more data on the pay of the three highest paid directors than the pay of the CEO and so we use the former). 7 In China, the top executives sit on the firm's board and so the three highest paid directors will be the three highest paid managers.
Variables
6 Our analysis of regional differences has its counterpart in international studies where research has investigated whether differences in corporate governance and institutional frameworks across countries affects a firm's decisions. 7 The average is computed as the total pay of the three highest paid directors, divided by three.
We use three dependent variables in the levels analyses. They are the log of the average compensation of the three highest paid executive directors (LnCOMP) and the average executive director's compensation relative to the average worker's pay, which we measure in two ways. First, we divide the average executive director's pay for a firm divided by the average worker's pay of the same firm; this is denoted 'RelCOMP'. Second, we run a regression of COMP on the average worker's pay and the cost of living of the province where the firm is located. Thus: and negative values imply managers are paid less than the "norm".
We use two measures of performance in the levels tests. These are stock returns (RET) and return on assets (ROA). 8 Stock return is the annualized rate of return for the year. Return on assets is operating income divided by total assets. 9 We include a number of control variables in the regression models. These controls include variables that prior research has shown to be important in explaining the level of top executive pay. We use the standard deviation of stock return (SDRET) and return on assets (SDROA) as measures of risk. Log of board size (LnBoardSize), the proportion of independent directors (IndDir), and directors' stockholdings (DirHolding) are included as governance variables. We use Log of total assets (Lnasset) as our measure of a firm's size; firm size is theoretically and empirically linked to top management compensation (Gabaix and Landier 2008).
Leverage (DA) is total debt divided by total assets and the market to book ratio (MB) represents growth opportunities.
We include two additional variables in the regression which are important controls given the China context of our study. Private is a dummy variable that is coded one (1) if the controlling stockholder is a private entity or person; Private is coded zero (0) if the dominant stockholder is the state (central, regional, or municipal government or an associated ministry or agency). State controlled firms may be more subject to political interference and the managers are more likely to be political appointees or former civil servants. LnCost is the log of the annual cost of living in the region where the firm is located; these figures are taken from official government statistics. The cost of living may be a factor that helps explain compensation. Industry and year dummies are additional controls. 10 Industry is based on the CSRC's expanded list of industries.
Regression models
The general form of the regression models is as follows:
The three measures of compensation (LnCOMP, RelCOMP, and AbnCOMP) are described in the previous section. We run the regressions with both contemporaneously and lagged independent variables. As both sets of results are similar, we just report the results using contemporaneously measured independent variables. We do not use panel models because some of the variables (e.g., governance and ownership variables) do not change over time and so their impact will be washed-out in panel models. We use robust standard errors to correct for firm clustering, heterogeneity, and autocorrelation.
In the pay and performance analyses we use change in compensation from one year to the next as the dependent variable. The independent variable is the change in performance. The models are:
Equation (3) is used to measure sensitivities and equation (4) is used to measure elasticities.
PERF is stockholder wealth or operating income. We show the correlation matrix in Table 2 ; in general, the correlations among the dependent variables are low. Variance inflation factors are quite small in the regression models and so multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major factor in interpreting the coefficients. 
Results

Descriptive statistics
The pay and performance relation
Following Murphy (1985, 1999) we examine pay-performance sensitivities and pay-performance elasticities. For the sensitivity analyses, we regress change in pay (∆COMP) on change in performance. As is standard in the literature, we express the change in pay for a 1000RMB change in shareholder wealth or a 1000 RMB change in operating profit. We also examine pay-performance elasticities. Here, we regress the change in log pay (∆LnCOMP) on the change in log performance.
We use two measures of performance. These are change in stockholder wealth (∆SW) and change in operating income (∆OI). For elasticities we use the change in log wealth (∆LnSW) and change in log operating income (∆LnOI). Shareholder wealth is the change in a firm's market capitalization plus dividends paid out. Market capitalization is the share price times the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. Operating income excludes non-core income, special items, and taxes. However, in sensitivity tests, we use net income as a replacement for operating income and find that the results are similar. 
The impact of regional development on compensation
As discussed in section 2.3., there are vast regional differences in China with respect to market development. In order to see if regional development has an impact on the pay-performance sensitivities and elasticities, we divide our sample into firms located in the more developed provinces and those located in the less developed provinces. To operationalize this procedure, we make use of a regional development index compiled by China's National Economic Research Institute (NERI).
The market development index captures the following aspects: (1) the relations between government and markets, such as the role of markets in allocating resources and enterprise burden in addition to normal taxes; (2) the development of non-state business, such as the ratio of industrial output by the private sector to total industrial output; (3) development of product markets, including considerations such as regional trade barriers; (4) development of factor markets such as FDI and mobility of labor; (5) development of market intermediaries and the legal environment (e.g., the protection of property rights). A high index score signifies a province with a strong and well established market development (good law enforcement, strong institutional investors, etc.). Fan and Wang (2003) give an extensive description of the index. Based on this index, we call a province with an above median score a "more developed region" and firms in these provinces are examined separately from firms in provinces with below median market development scores ("less developed region").
We classify regions as more developed if the market development index is above the median of and we classify other regions as less developed. We re-run the pay and performance relation regressions for those firms located in more developed regions and for those firms located in less developed regions. The results are shown in Table 5 , panel A, for more developed regions and in Table 5 , panel B, for less developed regions. Table 4 (all firms). One exception is that the ∆LnSW*Private coefficient is negatively significant.
This suggests compensation sensitivity to change in stockholder wealth is lower for private controlled firms in well developed regions. In Panel B (firms located in less developed regions), ∆OI and ∆LnSW have the expected positive signs but they are not statistically significant.
Perquisites
Our final analyses examine the perquisites data. There are several studies using U.S. data and most of them conclude that perks are wasteful 11 . Yermack (2006) finds that a CEO's perks are not related to their cash and stock option compensation but are negatively related to stock returns. Bebchuk and Fried (2006) describe managers' perks as camouflaged compensation that tries to avoid the scrutiny of stockholders and investors; they conclude that perks are unrelated to a 11 Lavelle and Grover (2005) and Hodgson (2004) give examples of management perks in the U.S., which they view as being wasteful. However, one study by Rajan and Wulf (2006) concludes that perks are a way to help superior managers become more productive.
manager's performance. Grinstein, Weinbaum, and Yehuda (2009) find that the stock market reacts negatively to announcements of perks in the U.S. and therefore shareholder value is reduced.
Andrews, Lin, and Yi (2009) provide similar evidence. In China, perks are often in the form of cash (e.g., cash allowances for travel, cash allowances for entertainment), and surpluses (i.e., allowances minus expenditures) are often pocketed by the top executives. Based on an analysis of a few cases known to the authors we believe the proportion of surplus to total allowances is similar across firms.
We investigate the determinants of perks compensation in Table 6 . The first two columns relate to the log of perks only (LnPERK) and columns 3 and 4 relate to abnormal perks (AbnPERK).
Abnormal perks is the residual from a regression of perks on a firm's size (log of sales), number of countries the firm operates in or sells to, and the number of industry segments the firm operates in.
These factors are expected to help explain perks and the residuals represent abnormal perks.
LnPERK and AbnCOMP are not related to performance. Perks (or excessive perks) are compensation but because they are not 'direct' and are not publicly linked to named executives, managers may feel there is no need to justify them (i.e., the compensation is "disguised" or camouflaged as business expenses). 12 The non-significant coefficients on the performance variables do not support Rajan and Wulf's conclusion (from the U.S.) that perks are a valuable incentive.
Older firms pay higher perks while firm size has no significant association with LnPerk and AbnPerk. Table 6 shows that the coefficients on Private are not statistically significant. Thus, there is no statistical evidence that state owned listed firms have higher perks.
In Table 7 we show the perks and performance relation. LnPERKS is not related to performance. The Private interaction terms are not significant. 
Summary and conclusions
Top management pay has been and continues to be a focus of fierce debate among academics, practitioners, and the public at large. At the forefront of the debates is how to properly incentivize top managers and how to prevent abuses by management. The focus of our study is the compensation of top management in China's listed firms. To date, comparatively little compensation research has been conducted using Chinese data.
Our sample data are from 2000 to 2005 and so we cover the later period of the economic reforms. Top management compensation is low by international and even regional standards. Part of this is explained by the low cost of living in China. Another explanation is that firms are adhering to the government's call for social harmony by keeping pay disparities between top management and workers comparatively low. The median management to worker pay is just 3.42. However, these conclusions are tempered by the fact that top managers receive perquisites which we believe often end up in the managers' pockets. We therefore include perks in our tests although the highly aggregated nature of the data places limits on our tests.
We find that there is a positive relation between pay and performance. The sensitivity of pay to increases in stockholder wealth is similar to that in the U.S. in the 1970s. Pay disparity is positively related to performance and this suggests performance is used to justify top managers earning a lot more than the average employee; this justification is important in the transition from a centrally planned socialist system to a market based economy. Performance also explains changes in compensation.
Our results show that private controlled firms pay more to their top management after accounting for other factors. However, the variables that are significant in explaining compensation are the same for both private controlled and state controlled firms. China is characterized as having great disparities in wealth and market development across different regions of the country. However, our results are robust to the different levels of market development. We also carry out some preliminary analyses on the levels of perquisites and find that they are not dependent on a firm's performance. However, there are caveats to working with perks data and so a more complete analysis awaits future research.
Our study is exploratory in nature as there are few stylized facts about top management compensation in China and the data lack the necessary detail to carry out certain tests. Nevertheless, we have been able to summarize some important characteristics of executive compensation and examine the determinants of pay and pay disparities. Our research has also identified a number of issues that future research can address if and when appropriate data become available. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Comp is the average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors ('000,000). LnComp is the log value of the average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors. CompRel is the ratio of the average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee (total cash paid to employees to total number of employees). AbnComp is abnormal compensation ('000,000). LnCompPerk is the log value of total annual compensation and perk consumption of directors. LnPerk is log value of perk compensation. AbnPerk is abnormal perk ('000,000). Perk compensation includes administrative expenses, traveling expenses, business entertainment expenses, communication expenses, overseas training expenses, director meeting expenses, driver expenses and bonus for directors. RET is industry-adjusted cumulative daily raw return for the year. SDRET is the standard deviation of the daily raw return for the year. ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets. SDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets for five years. ROS is industry-adjusted return on sales. SDROS is the standard deviation of return on sales for five years. EPS is industry-adjusted earnings per share. SDEPS is the standard deviation of earnings per share for five years. BoardSize is the number of directors on the board. LnBoardSize is the log value of the number of directors on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total number of directors on the board. LnAsset is the log value of total assets. LnCost is the log value of the living expenditure level of the province where the firm is located. LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the firm has been established. DA is the ratio of debt to total assets. MB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. DirHolding is the percentage of director shareholdings to total shares outstanding. Foreign is the proportion of firms that have a foreign listing. CompChg is the change in average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors. CompRelChg is the change in the ratio of the average annual compensation for the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee. AbnCompChg is the change in abnormal compensation. ROAChg is the change in industry-adjusted return on assets. ROSChg is the change in industry-adjusted return on sales. EPSChg is the change in industry-adjusted earnings per share. LnAssetChg is the change in total assets. DAChg is the change in debt to total assets. MBChg is the change in the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. Table 2 Correlation Coefficients RET is industry-adjusted cumulative daily raw return for the year. SDRET is the standard deviation of the daily raw return for the year. ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets. SDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets for five years. ROS is industry-adjusted return on sales. SDROS is the standard deviation of return on sales for five years. EPS is industry-adjusted earnings per share. SDEPS is the standard deviation of earnings per share for five years. LnBoardSize is the log value of the number of directors on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total number of directors on the board. LnAsset is the log value of total assets. LnCost is the log value of the living expenditure level of the province where the firm is located. LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the firm has been established. DirHolding is the percentage of director shareholdings to total shares outstanding. Foreign is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm issues B-shares or H-shares and 0 otherwise. ROAChg is the change in industry-adjusted return on assets. ROSChg is the change in industry-adjusted return on sales. EPSChg is the change in industry-adjusted earnings per share. LnAsset is the change in total assets. DAChg is the change in debt to total assets. MBChg is the change in the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. p-values are shown in parentheses. Table 3 Determinants of Compensation and Relative Compensation
LnCOMP is the log value of the average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors. RelCOMP is the ratio of the average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee (total cash paid to employees to total number of employees). AbnCOMP is abnormal compensation. RET is industry-adjusted cumulative daily raw return for the year. SDRET is the standard deviation of the daily raw return for the year. ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets. SDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets for five years. LnBoardSize is the log value of the number of directors on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total number of directors on the board. Private is a dummy variable which is coded 1 if the firm is a privately owned firm and 0 otherwise. LnAsset is the log value of total assets. LnCost is the log value of the living expenditure level of the province where the firm is located. LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the firm has been established. DirHolding is the percentage of director shareholdings to total shares outstanding. Foreign is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm issues B-shares or H-shares and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors. Table 6 An Analysis of Perk Compensation
LnPERK is log value of perk compensation. AbnPERK is abnormal perk. Perk compensation includes administrative expenses, traveling expenses, business entertainment expenses, communication expenses, overseas training expenses, director meeting expenses, driver expenses and bonus for directors. RET is industry-adjusted cumulative daily raw return for the year. SDRET is the standard deviation of the daily raw return for the year. ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets. SDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets for five years. LnBoardSize is the log value of the number of directors on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total number of directors on the board. Private is a dummy variable which is coded 1 if the firm is a privately owned firm and 0 otherwise. LnAsset is the log value of total assets. LnCost is the log value of the living expenditure level of the province where the firm is located. LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the firm has been established. DirHolding is the percentage of director shareholdings to total shares outstanding. Foreign is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm issues B-shares or H-shares and 0 otherwise. 
